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Abstract
In this article we analyze the effects of student work on academic performance for col-
lege students. In order to reduce the endogeneity bias due to selection into treatment, we
use propensity score matching technique. This approach allows us to estimate the average
treatment effects on the treated separately for different years of study, which is not possi-
ble when inside instruments are used to deal with endogeneity of student work. We find
predominantly negative treatment effects for all measures of academic performance (GPA,
exam attempts, exams passed, and likelihood of passing a year), although many of these are
economically and statistically insignificant. We supplement existing studies that do not es-
timate separate treatment effects for different years of study by showing that work while in
college harms study outcomes mostly in the first year of study—by passing smaller number
of exams and thereby increasing the likelihood of failing a year. Our results are consistent
with evidence on difficulty with adjusting to college studies of first-year students, who face
many uncertainties that affect finding the optimal allocation of time between studies, work
and leisure.
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1 Introduction
The human capital theory predicts that student work can either increase or decrease the stock of
accumulated knowledge and consequently improve or worsen individual productivity. Student
work may increase human capital through acquisition of new skills, abilities, and knowledge,
especially when work is related to studies, which may in turn contribute to academic success
and more importantly to the post-college labor market outcomes. At the same time student work
might crowd out time for studying and therefore impair academic performance, resulting in a
lower accumulation of human capital. In Bartolj and Polanec (2016) we study the potential
benefits of student work on post-college outcomes and find evidence of small positive effects of
student work experience on wages and likelihood of first regular employment, especially when
(i) jobs can be deemed as high skilled and (ii) related to the field of studies. In contrast, the focus
of this paper are the effects that student work has on academic performance.
A large body of existing empirical literature concentrated on the impact of student work on
high-school average grades. The conclusions of this line of research are, however, mixed. They
report (i) negative effect (Rothstein 2007; Tyler 2003; Singh 1998; Eckstein and Wolpin 1999;
Dustmann and Soest 2007—only for females; Lillydahl 1990—only for sizable levels of student
work), (ii) curvilinear effect (DeSimone 2006; Oettinger 1999; Post and Pong 2009; Quirk,
Keith, and Quirk 2001), and (iii) no effect (Lee and Orazem 2010). Papers that analyzed student
work during high school also found that it decreases time dedicated to education (Kalenkoski
and Pabilonia 2012 and DeSimone 2006), but positively affects graduation rates (Ruhm 1997
and Lee and Orazem 2010).
These results may not be applicable to the post-secondary studies due to important differ-
ences between high-school and college studies. The latter are usually less structured and have
fewer weekly hours in class, thereby permitting more hours of work even for students enrolled in
full-time programs. But at the same time, college students are supposed to take full responsibil-
ity for their decisions and are not guided by their teachers and/or parents. Hence they are more
likely to worsen their academic performance by engaging in too much paid work. Neverthe-
less, the empirical evidence on the effects of student work on academic performance for college
students is similarly inconclusive. Using GPA as a measure of academic performance, Darolia
(2014) and Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987) found no evidence that student work affects GPA,
while others found a negative effect (Beerkens, Ma¨gi, and Lill 2011; DeSimone 2008; Callen-
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der 2008; Kalenkoski and Pabilonia 2010; Auers, Rostoks, and Smith 2007; Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner 2003). Besides GPA, authors observed also ‘graduation-on-time’ (Ehrenberg and
Sherman 1987; Beerkens et al. 2011), number of credits per term (Darolia 2014), and drop-out
probabilities (Ehrenberg and Sherman 1987). All these measures of academic performance were
adversely affected by student work.1
In this paper we also study the effects of student work on academic performance for a set
of business and economics students who were first enrolled in four-year programs at the Faculty
of Economics, University of Ljubljana during the period 1997–2004. We use a rich data set on
study outcomes of students provided by this faculty, which contains all grades, number of exams
passed and information on students’ progressing to the next study year. Using unique student
identifiers we link these data with administrative data provided by the Slovenian Statistical Of-
fice, which contain information on total student pay—our measure of student work—and a large
set of variables that are likely affecting student choices regarding labor supply. Using merged
data set allows us to make two important contributions to the existing literature. First, we are
able to analyze the impact of student work on five distinct measures of academic performance
for the same set of students and within one institutional context, which allows us to compare the
treatment effects on different outcomes in relative terms. In line with the majority of existing
studies listed above, we measure the outcome of intensive margin of study effort—the average
GPA. However, in contrast to these studies, we are able to calculate both average GPA for all
attempts to pass and for passed exams only. Furthermore, we are also able to estimate the effects
on extensive margin of study effort, which is reflected in two measures: number of attempts to
pass exams and number of passed exams. Among the studies listed above, only Darolia (2014)
considered the effect of student work on the number of credits, which is (in our institutional
context) equivalent to the number of passed exams.2 Finally, we are able to measure the effect
of student work on the likelihood of passing/failing the study year, which may be interpreted as
an overall measure of academic success, reflecting both intensive and extensive margins of study
effort. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use this specific measure of study
outcome as other studies report the effects on the probability of dropping out. Our measure is
preferred to the probability of dropping out when many students decide to drop out for reasons
1Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987) find that only off-campus work negatively affected graduation-on-time and drop-
out probabilities in the third and fourth year of study.
2In our institutional context students had to pass a minimum number of exams rather than achieve a minimum
number of credits per study year.
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not related to study success.
Second contribution of this paper is its application of propensity score matching technique to
estimation of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATETs) of student work on academic
performance. While researchers used this method in other fields of labor economics, this is
the first attempt of using it to address this specific question. Our main motivation for using this
approach is to deal with endogeneity of treatment variable. Some researchers were able to exploit
natural experiments which exhibit exogenous variation in student work (e.g. Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner 2003). Our dataset is, however, constructed from administrative sources, which
implies that students included in the sample endogenously chose different amounts of work.
Several recent studies used either instrumental variables (IV) estimators (e.g. DeSimone 2008)
or generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators (e.g. Darolia 2014) to deal with this issue.
These methods yield different treatment effects—local average treatment effects on compliers—
which may not be the effects of main interest. More importantly, when using lagged variables as
instruments (i.e. inside instruments), it is not possible to estimate the treatment effects separately
for all years of study. Our results reveal important differences between different years of study,
which is an important advantage of using propensity score matching. Nevertheless, we recognize
the fact that propensity score matching can only reduce the part of endogeneity bias that may
be captured by observable determinants of student work. While these may be correlated to
unobservable characteristics, such as motivation, ability or preferences, we cannot be certain
that conditioning on observables has fully eliminated the effect of selection of work effort based
on unobservables. In order to minimize the selection bias, we used a large set of personal,
economic, family characteristics, and past academic performance, yielding quite high measures
of fit for our propensity score estimations.
Our treatment variable is measured with total nominal income that students earned in a
given study year, which in principle allows us to use propensity score matching with continuous
treatment. Unfortunately our sample did not satisfy the balancing property between all levels of
student work. Hence we use the standard propensity score matching for dichotomous variables
by discretizing the real annual pay. In particular, we use annual nominal pay of each student and
divide it by the average hourly pay for all students and the average number of hours per month to
obtain a proxy for the number of months worked. Based on this treatment variable, we calculate
ATETs for three levels of student work during a school year: 0–2 months (equivalent to 0–6.7
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hours per week), 2–7 months of work (6.7–23.3 hours per week) and more than 7 months.3
The advantage of this approach are valid estimates of ATETs, but, admittedly, at the expense
of estimating treatment effects for heterogeneous groups of students, which cannot be directly
compared.
Our estimates of treatment effects suggest that student work indeed harms academic per-
formance, a finding that resonates with many previous studies listed above, but with important
differences in terms of size of estimated treatment effects. We find mostly negative ATETs for
all measures of academic performance and all study years, although many of these are both
small and statistically insignificant. The effects are most harmful in the first year of study,
which is consistent with psychological literature providing evidence on difficulties with adjust-
ing to college studies (Baker and Siryk 1984). In particular, for our overall measure of study
outcomes—the probability to pass a year—we find significant negative effects for the first and
third year of study, while the effects are close to zero for the fourth year of study. For example,
first-year students working more than 7 months per study year (2–7 months) compared to those
working less than 2 months are 6.8 (4.7) percentage points less likely to pass a year. Adjusted
for units of measurement, these effects are twice as large than those reported by Ehrenberg and
Sherman (1987) for the probability of dropping out. The effects for the subsequent years of
study tend to be much smaller compared to Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987), who find the largest
effects for the fourth year of study. The treatment effects for the number of attempts to pass ex-
ams and the number of exams actually passed also exhibit similar variation with years of study,
although significant negative effects are found for all years of study. The absolute size of these
effects is, however, small even for the first year of study. Namely, first-year students working
more than 7 months per study year (2–7 months) compared to those working less than 2 months
passed 0.5 (0.26) exams less, which is, adjusted for units of measurement, roughly one-tenth of
the effect obtained by Darolia (2014). Finally, our estimates of treatment effects of student work
on the GPA are (relatively) smallest in size and mostly statistically insignificant. In comparison
to existing studies, our results are close to Darolia (2014) and Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987),
who found no harmful effect, and significantly lower (in absolute terms) than those obtained by
Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2010), DeSimone (2008) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant insti-
3These treatment levels are comparable to those used by other studies. For example, Beerkens et al. (2011) use
three treatment intervals with boundaries set at 9 hours per week and 25 hours per week.
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tutional framework. Section 3 presents data sources and summary statistics. Section 4 specifies
the estimation method and discusses findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Framework
Our empirical estimation of treatment effects of student work on study outcomes relies on data
for Slovenian students who were first enrolled in any four-year undergraduate program offered
by the Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana (henceforth FELU) during the period
1997–2004. As Slovenian institutional system may not be familiar to the reader, we provide a
brief account of its key features relevant to this study.
The FELU is in one of the largest tertiary education organizations in Slovenia, which (in
peak years) enrolled as many as 8,000 students in various full- and part-time undergraduate and
graduate programs. It is a part of the University of Ljubljana, which is located in country’s capi-
tal. The university is public and does not charge tuition fees to students with Slovene residence.
Students can enrol in the programs offered by the FELU after completing any four-year high
school program. The applicants are ranked nationally according to a weighted average grade,
calculated from the grade percentage averages achieved in the third and fourth year of high
school study and the national exam—matura—a Slovene equivalent of the SAT in the US.4
During the period of interest, the FELU offered five business majors (Accounting and Au-
diting, Business Informatics, Finance, Marketing, and Management and Organization) and three
economics majors (Banking and Finance, International Economics, and National Economics).
The majority of students chose majors in business studies such as Finance, Management and
Organization, and Marketing. The expected time to complete any four-year program at the Fac-
ulty of Economics was five years, which includes the additional year for completion of the final
thesis. The actual study time typically varied between 4 and 6 years, and could extend beyond 10
years. The grading scheme for undergraduate studies operates on a ten point scale with 1 as the
lowest and 10 as the highest grade. The lowest passing grade was 6.5 Students who failed to pass
an exam were allowed to retake it with no limit on the total number of attempts, although the
4The high-school grades range between 1 (insufficient) and 5 (excellent); 2 is the lowest passing grade. The
matura exam consists of three compulsory (Slovene language, Mathematics, and one foreign language—usually
English) and two elective subjects, such as Biology, History, Physics, etc.).
5These grades were often a simple mapping from achieved percentages like Grade = int(Score/10)+ 1, where
int denotes the integer part of the ratio.
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number of exam dates for each course was limited to three per academic year, two exam dates
were typically set after the semester of instruction (January and February after winter semester,
June and early July after summer semester) and one in September. Due to large number of stu-
dents, each lecture and class session was generally given more than once, especially in the first
two years of study, and students could usually freely choose when they would attend lectures in
a given course, which made their time schedule quite flexible.
All full-time students in Slovenia were entitled to generous subsidies, such as free-health
care, subsidized meals, and travelling expenses, and could work under different regulations than
regular employees. While regular-employment contracts were subject to high social contribu-
tions (38.2 percent of gross wage), student-employment contracts—referrals—were not subject
to any such tax during the period of interest. Employers were also obliged to pay a bonus for
working the night shifts, on Sundays, on holidays, for overtime work, seniority bonus, and bonus
for job performance to regular employees, none of which applied to student work.6 In addition,
employers had to cover regular employees’ costs for meals during working hours and daily com-
muting costs (SSC Act 2001). During the period of analysis gross wages were also subject to
a progressive payroll tax. All these factors contributed to rather high demand for student work
with total value reaching around 1.5% of GDP in the peak years, compared to aggregate wage
bill around 45% of GDP.
Student work could be performed by full-time students between 15 and 26 years of age,
who were enrolled in any state-approved primary, vocational, high school, or undergraduate
programs. Despite preferential tax treatment, student work was not completely tax free. It was
subject to a concession fee, value-added tax on concession fee, and personal-income tax. The
concession fee was rising over time, starting at 10% of students’ gross earnings from 1997 to
2003. From 2003 until 2006 it equalled 12% and afterwards 14% of students’ gross earnings.
The concession fees were paid by employers on top of students’ gross earnings. In addition,
employers had to pay value added tax on the concession fee. Therefore the total costs of student
work for the employer in 2008 were 116.8 percent of student’s gross earnings. Gross earnings
of students were also subject to a progressive personal-income tax. While the tax rates were the
same for all recipients of different types of personal income, income-tax deduction for students
was typically double that applicable to regular employees. As a consequence, net earnings were
the same as gross earnings for almost all students, even those who worked full-time entire year
6A useful summary of Slovenian labor markets during the period of analysis is given in OECD (2009).
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and received average (student) hourly wage. Since we are using data on gross earnings, we do
not describe details of personal-income taxation.
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources
As already mentioned above, our analysis uses information on a sample of Slovenian students
who were first enrolled in any of the 4-year undergraduate programs offered by the FELU be-
tween 1997 and 2004. We used data from several distinct sources, which were merged us-
ing person-specific identifiers in a secure room at the Slovenian Statistical Office (henceforth
SORS).
The first source of data is the FELU, which provided data from application sheets containing
personal information and data from exam records. From this source we extracted information on
age, gender, location of permanent residence, chosen major, and study year of students. Based
on enrolment history of each student, we also constructed variables that indicate if a student
passed a year and repeated a year. Exam records were used to construct the other four measures
of study performance—number of attempts to pass, number of exams passed, average grade of
all exams and passing exams only.
Next source of data is the Slovenian Tax Authority (henceforth TARS), which collects in-
formation on all personal incomes earned. The data on student earnings were reported to TARS
by the student employment agencies. While students with sufficiently low earnings were not
obliged to fill the personal-income-tax reports, these agencies had a legal obligation to report
labor incomes earned by each high-school or college student. Unfortunately data do not con-
tain information on month during which student work was performed, which prevents us from
knowing how much work was performed during the semesters and how much during the breaks.
TARS is also the source of data on incomes of students’ families. Tax filings for personal in-
come tax include both labor and capital incomes, which were used to calculate per capita family
incomes. Moreover, labor incomes of families include not only wages and salaries, but also
bonuses, perks, wages earned on the basis of short-term labor contracts, and royalties. Capital
incomes include interest, dividends, rents, and incomes of sole proprietors.
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The third source of data is the National Examination Center, which collects the data on
students’ high-school performance. We extracted information on the third- and forth-year av-
erage grades and the grades from final (external) examination matura. We used these grades to
construct a measure of high school GPA.
The last source of data is the SORS. It provided us with the data from the Central Registry of
Population, which allowed us to establish parent-child links through unique identifiers of both
parents for each student and thus to calculate family incomes and transfers for each student.
Having an identity of parents allowed us also to determine their educational attainment, which
was collected from the Statistical Registry of Employment. SORS also provided information
on all scholarships received by students, ranging from social scholarships targeted to students
with low-income families, scholarships given to talented individuals (Zois scholarships), and
scholarships granted by prospective employers.
3.2 Construction of Variables and Summary Statistics
Our sample of FELU students enrolled in four-year programs is restricted to (i) those aged
between 18 and 20 years when enrolled in the first year of study and (ii) those who finished high
school with general matura. The first restriction is due to lack of information on past academic
performance for older students, while the second one drops students who passed vocational
matura, which is not comparable to general matura and passing it did not suffice for enrolment
to university programs.7 Our final sample contains 3,707, 3,293, 3,201, and 3,103 students in
the first, second, third, and fourth year, respectively. The sample size and its structure by gender
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Sample Size by Gender
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year
Number of observations 3,707 3,293 3,201 3,103
Males 1,619 1,402 1,337 1,302
Females 2,088 1,891 1,864 1,801
Let us first describe the outcome variables measuring different aspects of academic perfor-
mance. As mentioned above we construct five distinct measures, for which we show the means
and standard deviations in the top panel of Table 2. The average grade is a variable that re-
7Student finishing vocational matura had to pass additional subject of general matura in order to be able to enrol
to university courses.
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flects the differences in the intensive margin of students’ study efforts. It is calculated as an
unweighted average of grades achieved in all exam attempts in a given year of study. All nega-
tive grades are set to 5, as the differences in negative grades do not exhibit the true variation in
knowledge.8 In the first year the average grade is 6.2, just above the minimum passing grade,
but it increases with study years to 7.6 in the last year of study. This is expected, as the less able
students drop out of program after failing a year and the remaining students become more apt in
finding optimal balance between study, work and leisure. We are also interested in the impact of
student work on grades conditional on passing; the averages for all passed exam range between
6.9 and 8.0 in the first and the last year of study, respectively.
The next two measures of academic performance reflect the extensive margins of study ef-
fort. These are the number of all attempts to pass exams and the number of exams passed. The
numbers of all courses/exams were 10 in the first and second year of study, between 8 and 9 in
the third year of study, and between 8 and 10 in the last year of study, depending on a chosen
major. In order to pass a year students were obliged to pass all but one course. Students might,
however, retake an exam in order to get a passing grade at previously failed exam, or to improve
a grade in a course, which they already passed. In the first years of study, the average number
of exam attempts exceeds the number of required exams by almost 40 percent, while in the sub-
sequent years this difference is significantly lower. The average numbers of passed exams in
the first two years—8.0 and 8.3, respectively—were short of the minimum required number of
passed exams to progress to the next year of study, which suggests that some students were not
able to pass the study year. The discrepancy between the number of exams passed and minimum
required number of exams passed to progress declines with years of study.
Our final measure of academic performance, which captures an overall effect of study efforts,
is a binary variable which equals one for students who passed a study year and zero otherwise.
Summary statistics reveal that a high percentage of students failed to proceed from the first to
the second year of study (33.8 percent), but the vast majority passed the last two years of study.
Next we turn to the measures of treatment—the prevelance of student work. Summary statis-
tics reported in Table 2 show that 81.5% of students were working in the first year of study. This
share only increased over the years of study and reached 95.1% by the final study year. Similarly,
the average real annual gross pay reported in constant (2004) prices was almost 1,500 EUR in
8Although the negative grades range from 1 to 5, grades 1 to 4 were rarely used by some examiners and instead 5
was given to all students who did not pass the required threshold.
10
the first year of study and increased to 2,614 EUR by the last year of study. As it is customary
in this strand of literature to report the effects of student work on study outcomes in terms of
time devoted to working, we also express our nominal variables in time equivalents. As we do
not observe actual wages for each student and year, we calculate the number of months worked
by dividing the nominal earnings by the average gross wage rate in that year, as reported by
the largest student employment agency e-Studentski servis, and the average number of working
hours in a month.9 Based on this indicator, we can see that an average student worked around
2.2 months in the first year of study and increased labor supply by roughly 0.5 months each year,
reaching 3.8 months by the last year of study.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Avg. grade 6.230 0.783 6.671 0.813 6.811 0.918 7.618 0.983
Avg. passing grade 6.897 0.588 7.379 0.603 7.343 0.714 7.977 0.777
No. of exam attempts 13.888 3.658 12.920 3.190 10.015 2.828 9.091 2.595
No. of exams passed 7.961 2.482 8.277 2.045 7.085 1.958 7.689 2.326
Passed a year 0.662 0.473 0.750 0.433 0.925 0.263 0.993 0.084
Working during study 0.815 0.389 0.881 0.324 0.915 0.279 0.951 0.217
Gross student work income 1,473 1,663 1,791 1,788 2,161 1,867 2,614 1,968
Months of student work 2.245 2.535 2.730 2.725 3.264 2.831 3.841 2.920
Female 0.563 0.496 0.574 0.495 0.582 0.493 0.580 0.494
Age 18.910 0.418 20.186 0.656 21.405 0.852 22.436 0.881
High school GPA 0.492 0.157 0.506 0.155 0.507 0.155 0.508 0.155
University or higher—mum 0.185 0.388 0.193 0.395 0.197 0.398 0.207 0.405
University or higher—dad 0.219 0.414 0.227 0.419 0.227 0.419 0.230 0.421
Student parent 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.039 0.002 0.053 0.003 0.062
Step parent 0.237 0.425 0.231 0.422 0.235 0.424 0.235 0.424
No. of siblings 1.026 0.719 0.981 0.726 0.928 0.749 0.865 0.747
Non-labor income 6,369 3,774 6,776 4,204 7,228 4,647 7,663 5,161
Conditional-income share 0.127 0.216 0.138 0.228 0.154 0.240 0.160 0.242
Expected net wage 16,244 2,646 16,053 2,590 15,870 2,512 15,851 2,490
Repeated previous year 0.271 0.444 0.200 0.400 0.065 0.246
School year 2,000.3 2.2 2,001.6 2.2 2,002.8 2.2 2,003.9 2.2
Notes: All income-related variables are in constant (2004) Euros. The exchange rate in 2004
was 1 EUR = 1.24 USD. The number of months worked is calculated by dividing the nominal
income earned by the average wage rate (for all students) and the average number of hours per
month.
The last set of statistics is describing the observable characteristics that are used in our
propensity score matching estimations. Personal characteristics are described by gender, age
and high school GPA. The latter is our measure of general ability, calculated as a normalized
unweighted average of (i) the average grade achieved at matura examination, and (ii) the av-
erage grade in the last two years of high school. From Table 2 is evident that the share of
9We assume the average number of working hours per month is 175, which is equivalent to 2,100 working hours
per year.
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females is slightly higher than 50% in all years of study. As females were slightly more likely
to progress, we observe slightly increasing shares with study years. Similarly, we also observe
that the average high-school GPA increased between the first and second year, suggesting that
less able students were more likely to fail the first year of study. The observed students’ family
characteristics include four binary variables indicating whether each of the two parents obtained
university degree or higher, a variable indicating if student has a child and a variable marking
students with step parents, and a variable measuring the number of siblings below the age of
27. Table 2 reveals that the share of parents with university degree was around 20% and slightly
increasing with study years, share of student parents was below 1%, whereas the share of stu-
dents with step parents was around 24%. Number of siblings was around 1 in the first year,
but decreased in subsequent years of study, mainly due to greater likelihood of siblings of older
students passing the age limit for dependent family members.
In order to capture economic background of students, we construct a measure of non-labor
income. It is calculated as a sum of (i) net family income per family member, which equals to the
sum of parental net income divided by the number of family members,10 (ii) scholarships, and
(iii) pensions received after deceased parents. The average non-labor income was about 6,369
EUR in the first year and increased to 7,663 EUR by the last year of study. As student labor sup-
ply decision and academic success might be influenced differently by a part of non-labor income
that depends on academic performance, we define a variable—conditional-income share—that
measures the proportion of scholarships and pensions in student’s non-working income. Table
2 shows that on average around 13% of non-labor income was contingent on study success in
the first year of study, and increased to 16% by the last year of study, suggesting that students
with greater share of such incomes were more likely to progress to the next study year. We also
include a measure of post-graduation expected annual net incomes. This measure captures the
incentives that influence allocation of time between work and study. In constructing this measure
we assume that students base their expectations of expected income on the most recent wage of
persons of the same gender who graduated in their major. Surprisingly, the average expected in-
come declined, which suggests that students coming from majors with lower expected incomes
were more likely to pass the year.
Lastly, in our propensity score estimations we also control for grade retention in the previous
10We count as family members parents and children under the age of 27, following the personal-income-tax act
that defines as a dependent family member a person up to the age of 26 (in addition to other requirements).
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year of study, school year, chosen major, and region of permanent address. The grade retention
reflects the time available for study and work as students have the opportunity to pass exams
for the subsequent study year during the repetition. In Table 2 is presented the share of students
that repeated the previous year of study. Not surprisingly, these shares were quite high—27%
and 20% in the second and third year of study, respectively. The last three variables attempt to
capture the differences in labor market as well as study conditions. For example, chosen major
affects the labor demand for students as well as the academic requirements. Similarly, different
regions offer diverse job opportunities, but at the same time affect the financial resources and
time available for study and work, as those who live in regions located further away from the
faculty have to travel daily or rent a room. We present the structure of sample by region in the
Appendix (Table 5). From the table it is evident that roughly 45% of all students originate in the
Osrednjeslovenska region, where the FELU is located.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Estimation Method
In order to estimate the treatment effects of student work on different measures of academic
performance, we match students with different employment choices, but similar predicted prob-
abilities or propensity scores of student employment level. The advantages of using this type of
matching approach for our problem are two-fold. First, propensity score matching (PSM) avoids
the dimensionality problem of finding matched subjects when there are many control variables.
Depending on the year of study, our set of control variables is 39 in the first year, 42 in the sec-
ond year and 49 in the last-two years, which requires sufficiently large bins for many variables in
order to satisfy balancing property. Second advantage is that it imposes minimal structure on es-
timation. Another feature of matching approach, which we consider as an advantage, is putting
emphasis on observations with similar values of regressors. This means that observations at the
margin may get little or no weight and thus bear little influence on results. In contrast, OLS tries
to minimize squared errors, which may give observations at the margin large weights.
We estimate propensity scores using a logit regression for probability of working k hours
during study year (SWk), using personal characteristics (x) and academic performance in previous
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study year (A) as explanatory variables:
Pr[SWki = 1] = Λ(α0+α1xi+α2Ai+ui), (1)
where i indexes individuals and Λ denotes the cumulative logistic distribution function. This
conditional probability of receiving treatment (k hours of student work) given x and A is used
to match treated observations to controls with similar values of propensity scores. The calcu-
lation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is then based on two assumptions:
(i) conditional independence (also called selection on observables, unconfoundedness, or ignor-
ability)11 and (ii) overlap or matching assumption.12
The matching algorithm used in our analysis is radius matching with replacement and im-
posed common support. This type of matching is a variant of caliper matching that uses all
control units within the caliper (or radius) and not only the nearest neighbor as it is done with
caliper matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). This feature of radius matching reduces the bias
of estimates. Bias is further reduced by matching with replacement, since it allows a treatment
unit to be matched to control unit even if control unit was already matched. As suggested by
Austin (2011), we use caliper equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity
score.13
As we expect different levels of student work to have different impact on academic perfor-
mance, we do not differentiate only between working and non-working students, but instead cre-
ate three different binary treatment variables, which lead to estimation of three different ATETs.
As shown in Table 3, we use students who have less than 2 months of work experience as a
control group for two groups: (i) students with 2–7 months of work experience (with ATET11 as
corresponding treatment effect) and (ii) students with more than 7 months of work experience
in a given study year (ATET12). Similarly, students who have 2–7 months of work experience
are used as a control group for the groups of students with more than 7 months of experience
(ATET22). The rationale for the first boundary set at 2 months is the length of summer holidays,
11Conditional on x, outcomes of treatment (y1) and control group (y0) are independent of treatment (D). Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) showed that if the former holds, y1 and y0 are also independent of D for given value of
propensity score.
12For every value of propensity score, there are observations in both control and treatment groups.
13We also considered other matching algorithms and other caliper values but obtained qualitatively similar ATETs.
We chose this method because it is in line with the recommendation to make a control group as locally comparable
as possible to the treated, and baseline differences as little as possible in order to estimate the treatment effects using
comparable subjects (Lee, 2005).
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while the other two boundaries aim to split the remaining 10 months into two intervals for the
winter and summer semesters. In order to be able to compare our results to those in the litera-
ture, we can express these intervals in terms of weekly hours of work. Assuming 52 weeks per
year and 40 hour work week, 2 months of work is equivalent to 6.7 hours of work per week,
whereas 7 months is equivalent to 23.3 hours per week. These values are similar to those used
by Beerkens et al. (2011) with boundaries set at 9 and 25 hours per week.
An alternative approach to estimation of treatment effects would be to apply continuous
matching as proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004). As the main advantage, this approach
would allow us to estimate local treatment effects for small intervals of student work. However,
the response function requires general propensity score to balance pre-treatment variables over
all defined intervals, which is in general hard to achieve. The balancing property for continuous
matching could not be satisfied for our data, which led us to estimate different propensity scores
for different intervals of student work.14 Namely, we use the same set of personal characteristics
in the estimation equation, but allow for different values of regression coefficients.15 However,
a downside of this approach is that ATETs cannot be directly compared. Namely, ATET22 is not
equal to the difference between ATET12 and ATET11, since control groups are, in general, not
the same.
Table 3: Construction of Treatment and Control Groups Based on Amount of Student Work
TREATMENT
Student work experience 2–7 months more than 7 months
less than 2 months ATET11 ATET12
2–7 months ATET22
The sample size by treatment and control groups is presented
in Table 6 in Appendix.
In this manner we estimate the direct effect of student work on academic success, which
is measured with average grade, average passing grade, number of exam attempts, number of
passed exams, and probability to pass the study year. The indirect effect of student work on
academic success in a subsequent period, through academic success in current period, is not
accounted for. See also Figure 1 for representation of causal chain and the estimated ATET.
Observed covariates xi in Equation (1) include indicator variables for different levels of non-
14We also considered alternative intervals for calculation of ATETs (e.g. 2-month intervals), but also faced viola-
tion of the balancing property in some cases. When balancing property was satisfied, the results we present and those
for smaller intervals were nevertheless comparable.
15The set of controls increases with years of study as we include past academic performance measures from the
second year onwards and indicators for selected majors from the third year of study.
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labor income, being female, having step parent, having children, university degrees of mother
and father, region of residence, school years and selected majors during college studies in the
last two years of study. In addition, set of covariates also comprises share of study-success-
contingent income in non-labor income (of students), expected net wage, age, high school GPA,
and number of siblings under the age of 27. Furthermore, we add three variables measuring past
academic success (Ai) in propensity score equations for the second to fourth year of study. These
are number of passed exams and average grade in the previous year, and an indicator variable for
repeating previous year of study. We do not control for past student work, as it does not induce
imbalance across treatment and control groups once we control for past academic success.
Our use of propensity score matching does not imply that the estimated ATETs may not suf-
fer from any selection bias. When balancing property is achieved the conditional independence
assumption holds only for observable characteristics. Moreover, the estimated logit regressions
yield McFadden’s Pseudo R2 between 0.044 and 0.14 for different amounts of work and different
years of study, which suggests that observed characteristics capture some, but not all, variation
in chosen amounts of labor supply. The unobservable heterogeneity between students may still
lead to biased ATETs. For our study are particularly worrying the implications of incompletely
capturing heterogeneities of students in terms of preferences, motivation and ability with observ-
able characteristics. A priori the direction of omitted variables bias is unclear, as these variables
could affect student work and study effort in the same or in the opposite direction. Namely, we
would expect an upward (downward) bias in ATETs and less (more) likely negative effect of
student work on academic outcomes if omitted variable changes student work and study effort
in the same (opposite) direction. It is possible that greater unobserved motivation (or ability,
preference for leisure) increases both student work and study effort and the estimated ATETs
are upward biased, but also that greater unobserved motivation for studies leads to lower labor
supply in which case the ATETs would be downward biased. It is important to keep this caveat
in mind when interpreting the results.
4.2 Unconditional Effects of Student Work
Prior to the presentation of the estimated treatment effects, we provide some descriptive evidence
on the unconditional relationships between student work experience and the five measures of
academic performance. Figures 2 to 5 in Appendix show scatter plots with frequency-weighted
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markers. These plots reveal rather strong negative relationships between the extent of student
work based on total pay and our measures of academic performance, which are suggesting that
student work harms study outcomes. Negative relationship is observed for the intensive margin
of study effort reflected in the two measures of average grade, the extensive margin of effort
reflected in the number of passed exams and number of all attempts to pass exams, and in the
overall measure of study success—the probability to pass a year. Based on this descriptive
evidence, we are led to conclude that students who work more hours are likely putting less effort
in each exam (lower average grade) and prepare for smaller number of exams, which culminates
in lower likelihood to pass a year.16
Comparison of these unconditional relationships suggests that student work harms academic
success more in the early years of study. For example, the overall measure of study success—
the probability to pass a year—declines by almost 20 percentage points between 1 month and 7
months of work for students who were enrolled in the first year of study, while in the fourth year
of study this difference in probability is less than 5 percentage points. These differences between
study years suggest that student work is riskier in the early years of study as students face greater
uncertainty about the expected effort required to pass exams, which may be attributed to the well-
known effect of adjustment to college (Baker and Siryk, 1984). Moreover, the group of students
enrolled in the higher years of studies consists of only those who were able to pass, which makes
them less heterogeneous in terms of ability.
Before turning to the discussion of estimated treatment effects, we make two additional re-
marks regarding unconditional relationships between student work and academic performance.
First is about the shape of these relationships and potential biases if one were to ignore the en-
dogenous selection. On one hand the shape appears inverse U-shaped for several measures of
academic performance in several years of study with peak at around 3 months.17 While this may
suggest that the trade-off between student work and academic performance only kicks in for
those who work more than 3 months, it may also be a consequence of selection into treatment.
Namely, if working students are also more motivated (or more able) than those not working, they
can achieve better academic results. Similarly, rather large negative effects of student work may
16Note that the total number of attempts to exams does not have an a priori negative relationship with student work.
Students who work more are less likely to pass and consequently may exhibit more attempts to pass exams.
17Note that this pattern is not unique to our data. Darolia (2014) finds a similar inverse U-shaped pattern using US
National Longitudinal Youth Survey 1997 with peak around 5 hours of work per week for full-time students, which
is equivalent to 1.5 months of work per year.
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also be partly driven by selection. In fact, pre-matching comparison of high-school GPAs and
parental education between students with different levels of work shows that students who decide
to work more are those with worse grades and lower incidence of university degree by parents.
These differences are significantly reduced when comparing the pre- and post-matching charac-
teristics of controls and treated on our sample, which suggests that propensity score matching
significantly reduces selection bias.
Second remark is about a peculiar feature of our scatter plots, which exhibit very dispersed
and even improved academic performance for students who worked around 10–11 months per
year. This is observed for four measures of study (exception being the number of all attempts to
pass exam) primarily in the first year of study. We believe this is partly due to smaller samples
of students used to calculate the averages, but also due to possibility that some of the students
participated in tax evading activities. Since taxation of student work was significantly lower than
that of regular employment contracts, students could earn a fee by allowing firms to extract cash
from their businesses through alleged student work.18 Students who engaged in such activities
often aimed to transfer an amount that was just below the sum of general deduction and student-
specific deduction as the marginal tax rate was 0% and the total cost for employer was between
110% and 114% of the gross value of student work. Given the observed patterns it is possible
that our estimates suffer from attenuation bias for larger amounts of student work. Hence, the
true harmful effects of actual student work on academic performance could be underestimated
for larger values of our measures of student work.
4.3 ATETs of Student Work on Academic Performance
In this section we present the treatment effects of student work on academic performance using
the propensity score methodology. The propensity score balances all variables in all estimations
at p-value of 0.05. This confirms validity of conditional independence assumption for observable
characteristics and implies that the estimated ATETs are based on students with very similar
characteristics who chose different amounts of student work. The ATETs for average grades,
attempts to pass, number of passed exams and likelihood to pass are shown in Table 4. Overall,
we find that the estimated ATETs are in line with the descriptive statistics, which suggests that
student work indeed harms study outcomes. The treatment effects are, however, significantly
18For example, a fee could amount to 5% of transferred cash.
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lower in size when compared to the effects implied by unconditional relationships in Figures 2
to 5, which confirms our concern about the selection into treatment.
Let us start with description of the estimated effects on the average grades. The majority of
estimated ATETs are negative, a finding that is consistent with observed negative unconditional
relationships. In terms of sign and size, the effects for the two GPA measures, calculated from
all grades and passing grades only, are fairly similar. Moreover, at least one statistically signif-
icant effect is found between second and fourth year of study, while no ATET is significant in
the first and third year of study. The most harmful negative effects (in absolute terms) appear to
be in the fourth year, although even these are rather small and economically insignificant. For
example, the largest effect is -0.13 (1.7% of the average grade in fourth year) when student work
is increased from 2-7 months to more than 7 months. In order to compare our results with pre-
vious studies, note that a decrease of Slovenian GPA by 0.13 is equivalent to 1.3 percent grade
and 0.03 points on US 4.0 scale. Converting this to an hour equivalent using for simplicity uni-
form distribution of student work within treatment intervals, additional hour of work per week
is at most reducing GPA by 0.0025 points. Our estimated effects are closer to those obtained by
Darolia (2014) and Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987), who found no evidence of student work af-
fecting GPA, and significantly smaller than those estimated by Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2010),
DeSimone (2008) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003), who found that additional hour of
work per week reduces GPA by 0.017, 0.11 and 0.16 points, respectively.
Next we discuss the ATETs of student work on the numbers of exam attempts and exams
passed (Table 4). Note first that the sign of the effect of student work on the number of attempts
is a priori ambiguous. Higher number of exam attempts is due to either students putting more
effort into studies and trying to pass as many exams as possible or putting too little effort and
failing to pass exams and thus having to retake them. The estimated ATETs are nevertheless
mostly negative not only for the total number of exams passed, but also for the number of exam
attempts. Yet the negative effects for the number of attempts are significant mainly in the first
year, whereas for the number of exams passed significant negative effects are observed in all
four years. In contrast to ATETs for average grades, for which the most harmful effects are
found in the last two years of study, ATETs for the number of passed exams imply that student
work is most harmful in the first and fourth year of study. For example, first-year students
working 2–7 months and students working more than 7 months attempted to pass 0.418 (3% of
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average number of exam attempts) and 0.644 less exams (4.6%) than their peers working less
than 2 months. Similarly, first-year students working 2–7 months and students working more
than 7 months pass 0.263 (3.3% of average number of exams) and 0.492 (6.2%) less exams
than their peers working less than 2 months. The same difference in the amount of work has
significantly smaller negative impact in the second and third year of study (less than or around
3%), whereas in the fourth year even bigger effect is observed when comparing more than 7
months of work to 2–7 months of work. In order to compare our result with previous studies, we
recalculate the estimated effects per hour of work. Our largest ATET of 0.02 less passed exams
per additional hour is significantly lower than the estimated effect by Darolia (2014), who found
0.2 less completed courses per hour worked.
The effects of student work on the two margins of study effort are ultimately reflected in
the probability to pass the study year, an encompassing measure of study effort. The ATETs
reported in Table 4 are mostly negative, which suggests that student work indeed reduces study
effort. The economically and statistically most significant effects are mainly observed for the
first year of study, which is consistent with above result that students who work more attempt to
pass and actually pass less exams. Namely, students pass the first year of study with 4.7 and 6.8
percentage points lower probability if they work 2–7 months and more than 7 months instead
of less than 2 months, respectively. In comparison to the average probability of passing a year
(67 percent in the first year), the two ATETs imply 5 and 10% lower probability of passing in
the first year. In subsequent study years student work can reduce the probability of pass by 3
percantage points in the second year and 5 percentage points in the third year, although these
negative effects only kick in when students engaged in more than 7 months of work compared
to less those with less than 2 months of work.
Our results are not directly comparable to other studies in the literature as these estimated
effects of student work on different variables of interest. The closest outcome variable to ours is
the probability of dropping out, which is one of the outcome variables of interest in the analysis
by Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987). This variable reflects both voluntary decisions to drop out
by students not interested in studies or pursuing other goals and involuntary drop outs due to
inability to pass a year. Thus the effects of student work on this indicator should be higher
than those found in our study as students not interested in studies might explore labor market
prospects even before dropping out. Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987) found that 20 hours of work
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per week increased the probability of dropping out by 3-3.4 percentage points in the first three
years of study and 4.5 percentage points in the last year of study. Expressing these marginal
effects and ATETs per hour of work per week, we find that the probability of not passing a year
in the first year increases by 0.0024 per hour of work per week in our data (for both estimates),
whereas the marginal effect estimated by Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987) is 0.0016 per hour of
work per week. However, our estimates for the subsequent years are significantly smaller than
those by Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987).
In a nutshell, the results based on ATETs show that work during studies indeed negatively
affects study success. The largest negative effects on the probability of passing a year and the
number of passed exams are observed in the first year of study when students change environ-
ment and face many uncertainties regarding required work effort to pass a year. This finding
is consistent with a large psychological literature, which has extensive evidence on the deter-
minants of first-year college persistence (see, for example, Pascarella and Terenzini 1983 and
Kahn and Nauta 2001) and difficulties with adjusting to college (see Baker and Siryk 1984).
Harmful effects of work are also observed in subsequent years of study, although these effects
are smaller and more nuanced. Sizeable and significant negative effects on the probability to
pass a year are observed also in the third year of study, while negative effects in the second year
are not significant and in the final year they are negligible. The negative effects of student work
on the number of passed exams is observed in all years of study, whereas some negative effects
on average grades are observed in the second and fourth year of study.
As already mentioned above we believe our estimates may suffer from measurement error in
student work related to tax evading activities of students. This bias likely attenuates the estimated
treatment effects particularly for larger values of student work. Nevertheless, we believe that this
phenomenon was relatively modest. One strong reason against the importance of tax evasion
stems from the observed shape of the distribution of earnings. As it was rational for all students
to engage in tax evasion, all that had a possibility to do so, should have exploited this possibility
up to the amount of student tax deduction. This would lead to a distribution of earnings with a
peak at the level of tax deduction, which is not observed in our data. Moreover, we should not
observe any relationship between student work and academic performance if student work was
mainly used as a mode for tax evasion. Thus, while we are aware that our measure of student
work is not ideal, we believe, that student work had rather modest negative effects on academic
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performance for the FELU students.
There is, however, also concern that the estimated ATETs are downward biased due to mea-
surement error that arises from using real annual pay as a measure of student work rather than
actual hours worked. As we estimate working hours using a fixed average wage in each given
year, variation in hours worked does not reflect only actual hours worked, but also differences
in hourly wages. If students who were earning more also had better paying jobs, the estimated
ATETs would suffer from this additional source of attenuation bias. While this may indeed be a
problem, we put forward several reasons why we believe this is not the case. First, as opposed
to regular employment, student work does not exhibit large differences in pay based on educa-
tional attainment and work experience. Students predominantly perform simple tasks (e.g. basic
administrative work, cashiers, furniture movements, etc.) that do not require high human capital
and pay comparable rates. Second, our matching approach relies on many personal character-
istics (e.g. gender, GPA, college major) that might be correlated with performance of certain
highly-paying jobs (e.g. hostess). Third, in order to investigate whether earned student income
(or supplied number of working hours) is correlated with wages, we used the data on hours
worked and wages from the largest Slovenian employment agency e-Sˇtudentski servis and the
largest platform for matching students of the FELU with potential employers. Unfortunately,
these data are not available for the entire period and all students used in our analysis as it covers
the period between 2005 and 2007. The overlap with our main data set is 1,282 observations
for students who were working and who were enrolled between second and fourth year of study.
Using this restricted set of observations we estimated a regression model for the log of hourly
wage with log of annual earnings and the same set of controls we used in the propensity score
estimations. The estimate of regression coefficient or partial elasticity for working income is
0.052 (s.e. = 0.17), which confirms the implied positive relationship. However, this estimate
yields small differences in absolute wages when we predict wages for different levels of income
while keeping other variables fixed. Namely, even if we increase annual work income from 656
EUR (1 month) to 7,872 EUR (12 months), the predicted hourly wage would increase only by
12.7%. This difference is not sufficiently large to generate quantitatively large attenuation bias
in ATETs.
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Table 4: Estimates of ATETs of Student Work on Academic Performance Measures
Avg. grade Avg. passing grade No. of exam attempts
2–7 months over 7 months 2–7 months over 7 months 2–7 months over 7 months
1st Year
less than 2 months −0.001 0.007 0.004 0.021 −0.418∗∗ −0.644∗
(0.028) (0.056) (0.021) (0.042) (0.134) (0.261)
2–7 months 0.018 0.028 −0.239
(0.056) (0.041) (0.266)
2nd Year
less than 2 months −0.072∗ −0.067 −0.051∗ −0.058 −0.022 0.008
(0.030) (0.053) (0.024) (0.040) (0.123) (0.212)
2–7 months 0.040 0.028 −0.046
(0.053) (0.041) (0.209)
3rd Year
less than 2 months −0.053 −0.056 −0.033 −0.032 −0.163 −0.223
(0.035) (0.051) (0.028) (0.041) (0.114) (0.184)
2–7 months −0.040 −0.022 0.133
(0.052) (0.041) (0.171)
4th Year
less than 2 months −0.051 −0.106 −0.055 −0.113∗ 0.010 −0.299
(0.042) (0.063) (0.032) (0.047) (0.116) (0.177)
2–7 months −0.130∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.378∗∗
(0.050) (0.041) (0.144)
No. of exams passed Passed a year
2–7 months over 7 months 2–7 months over 7 months
1st Year
less than 2 months −0.263∗∗ −0.492∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.068∗
(0.094) (0.184) (0.018) (0.033)
2–7 months −0.198 −0.013
(0.198) (0.035)
2nd Year
less than 2 months −0.202∗∗ −0.167 −0.022 −0.032
(0.077) (0.139) (0.016) (0.030)
2–7 months 0.069 −0.000
(0.137) (0.030)
3rd Year
less than 2 months −0.229∗∗ −0.216 −0.012 −0.050∗
(0.080) (0.126) (0.010) (0.020)
2–7 months 0.036 −0.038
(0.121) (0.020)
4th Year
less than 2 months 0.009 −0.287 −0.004 −0.005
(0.106) (0.163) (0.003) (0.005)
2–7 months −0.469∗∗ 0.001
(0.126) (0.005)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at
p< 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively. The number of months worked is calculated by dividing
the nominal income earned by the average wage rate (for all students) and the average number
of hours per month.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the impact of student work on academic performance using five distinct
measures of academic performance. Unlike Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003), who exploit
quazi-natural experiment with random assignment of students into different amounts of work,
our data are administrative and unconditional relationships based on these may suffer from po-
tential problem of endogenous selection into treatment. We deal with this issue by estimating
the average treatment effects on the treated (ATETs) using the propensity score matching with a
large set of observable personal characteristics and measures of past academic success. This ap-
proach allows us to estimate the treatment effects separately for all four years of undergraduate
studies and for different levels of treatment.
Our results support previous studies, which have found harmful effects of student work, as
we obtain predominantly negative ATETs. These effects nevertheless vary between different
measures of academic performance and years of study, both in terms of economic and statistical
significance. We find that student work has the worst effects in the first year of study, which is
in line with evidence on difficulties with adjusting to college studies (Baker and Siryk, 1984).
For our overall measure of study effort—the probability of passing a year—the largest effect
is as large as 6.8 percentage points when students work more than 7 months (per study year)
compared to those who work less than 2 months. When adjusted for units of measurement, our
ATETs are even higher than those by Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987), who use drop out as an
outcome measure. For the subsequent years of study, however, we find quantitatively smaller
results than those reported by Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987). As students are required to pass a
minimum number of exams, the estimated ATETs for the numbers of exams passed (and number
of attempts to pass exams) are similar, although smaller than those reported by Darolia (2014).
Namely, the most harmful effects are observed for the first year of study as more than 7 months
of work compared to less than 2 months reduces the number of passed exams by 0.5, which
represents 5 percent of all required exams in the first year. For subsequent study years the
ATETs are typically lower, with exception of fourth year—when students were obliged to pass
less exams to progress a year. Finally, we find that student work had the least harmful effects on
average grades. Even taking the largest values found for the fourth year of study, our effects are
small in size when compared to those reported by Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2010), DeSimone
(2008) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003).
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In summary, we find that student work has small negative effect on different measures of
academic performance for work that exceeds 2 months per academic year. Although our results
are based on data for a single institution in a small nation, the results can be generalized to
similar institutional contexts, which allow students to adjust study and work schedules quite
easily due to non-obligatory attendance rules and repetition of classes. Students in faculties with
less flexible timetable may find it harder to balance work and study, and thus the negative effects
of work might be larger.
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Appendix
Table 5: Structure of Sample by Region
Region 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year
Pomurska 1.67 1.49 1.56 1.55
Podravska 1.32 1.31 1.28 1.32
Korosˇka 1.81 1.67 1.69 1.74
Savinjska 7.72 7.44 7.37 7.35
Zasavska 1.92 2.06 2.12 2.19
Spodnjeposavska 2.32 2.25 2.31 2.06
Jugovzhodna 8.96 9.20 9.53 9.38
Osrednjeslovenska 45.51 45.19 44.80 45.25
Gorenjska 13.33 13.54 13.59 13.44
Notranjsko - krasˇka 2.48 2.46 2.56 2.51
Gorisˇka 7.09 7.29 7.31 7.32
Obalno - krasˇka 5.88 6.10 5.87 5.90
Table presents shares in percent of respective column
total.
Table 6: Sample Size by Treatment and Control Groups
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year
Number of observations 3,707 3,293 3,201 3,103
Student work experience
less than 2 months 2,206 1,717 1,321 979
2–7 months 1,249 1,267 1,501 1,645
more than 7 months 252 309 379 479
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Figure 1: Representation of Causal Chain
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Figure 2: Academic Performance by Student Work in the First Year of Study. The size of markers
is proportional to the frequency of students with a specific value of student work. Markers with
frequency lower than 10 are omitted. The number of months worked is calculated by dividing
the nominal income earned by the average wage rate (for all students) and the average number
of hours per month.
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Figure 3: Academic Performance by Student Work in the Second Year of Study. The size of mark-
ers is proportional to the frequency of students with a specific value of student work. Markers
with frequency lower than 10 are omitted. The number of months worked is calculated by di-
viding the nominal income earned by the average wage rate (for all students) and the average
number of hours per month.
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Figure 4: Academic Performance by Student Work in the Third Year of Study. The size of markers
is proportional to the frequency of students with a specific value of student work. Markers with
frequency lower than 10 are omitted. The number of months worked is calculated by dividing
the nominal income earned by the average wage rate (for all students) and the average number
of hours per month.
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Figure 5: Academic Performance by Student Work in the Fourth Year of Study. The size of mark-
ers is proportional to the frequency of students with a specific value of student work. Markers
with frequency lower than 10 are omitted. The number of months worked is calculated by di-
viding the nominal income earned by the average wage rate (for all students) and the average
number of hours per month.
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